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“What does it mean to be Hindu today?” This question stands at the heart of Vamsee 
Juluri’s Rearming Hinduism. It is a peculiar question. On the one hand, it appears to be of 
tremendous importance in the twenty-first century. The expanding middle classes in India 
are playing a major role in the economic growth and political rise of the country and most 
of these middle-class families are Hindu (or, at least, identified as such). The way they 
understand what it means to be Hindu in our times – how they relate to life, society, and 
the world as Hindus – could have a massive impact on the future of humanity.  
On the other hand, it is unclear what would count as an answer. The Indian 
traditions never raised such questions about Hindu identity or the meaning of being 
Hindu. There are no precepts that people should follow in order to be Hindus. No one 
possesses the authority to tell another individual whether he or she is being a good Hindu, 
let alone a genuine one. Is it then a borrowed question, alien to the traditions about which 
it is being raised? This seems to be the case: the concern to find out what it means to be 
Hindu emerged mainly among Indians living in the United States – a country obsessed 
with identity politics.  
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The roots of this type of question reach far back into history. Sixteen centuries 
ago, in the age of Saint Ambrose and Saint Augustine, early Christians raised it with 
some urgency: “Quid sit Christianum esse – what is it to be a Christian?” (Markus 1990: 
19) Over the centuries, many views crystallized as to what it means to be Christian, from 
martyrdom through monastic asceticism to the missionary life. The dominant modes of 
being Christian gave shape not only to individual lives in the Western-Christian world 
but also to its cultural projects. To a significant extent, the contemporary world is the 
product of this process: the crystallization of views about the true nature of being 
Christian went hand-in-hand with the emergence of many of the institutions we consider 
‘modern’ today. 
Given how different the Hindu traditions are from Christianity, they are unlikely 
to establish similar orthodoxies as to what it means to be Hindu. In this sense, “What 
does it mean to be Hindu?” is indeed a borrowed question. Yet, it seems to resonate with 
more and more people. It expresses a sense of disorientation, a sense that something is 
not quite right with the state of the Hindu traditions today. As Juluri puts it:  
 
We are living right now in a moment of vast civilizational hunger. It is not 
fundamentalism, nor fascism. It is an exceptional historical moment in which an 
entire generation of young, modern Hindus in India and the diaspora is growing 
up and asking only one pressing question: who are we, really? (117) 
 
This question is not the subject of dry academic scholarship. Even though Juluri is a 
professor of Media Studies at the University of San Francisco, his book is neither a 
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scientific treatise nor a slice of science journalism. It is neither the exposé of a spiritual 
teacher nor a commentary on ancient Hindu texts, neither political propaganda nor 
religious pontificating. So what kind of book is it then? This is hard to say. In fact, one of 
the appealing aspects of Juluri’s book is that it leaves the well-trodden path to explore a 
new genre of writing.  
Rearming Hinduism presents itself as “a handbook for intellectual resistance” – a 
work that teaches today’s Hindus how to defend their traditions against what Juluri calls 
the reigning ‘Hinduphobia’. But its title is misleading: it should not be mistaken for a 
militant apologia for Hinduism. It intends to be much more. The ‘rearming’ is more a 
rediscovering – a making aware once again: “You must remember. We came from a 
world of wisdom we can barely fathom in today’s terms. And we are here, still” (3). It is 
also a search to recover a lost voice: “We belong to a moment in history when Hinduism 
is beginning to wake up, if not from a long slumber, then at least a long silence” (2). “We 
want a culture that is the best of what we know lies at the heart of our Hinduism. We 
want our civilization back” (119). This voice must speak not just to Hindus but to all of 
humanity: “When Hindu thought truly informs the social sciences and humanities, it will 
revolutionize knowledge, humanity, and indeed the future of the world itself” (31).  
In several ways, then, Juluri’s work is a call to cultural renaissance: a plea to 
reinstate the knowledge and wisdom embodied by the Hindu traditions and make it 
available to the world. At times, he succeeds in conveying the awe-inspiring scale of 
what is at stake. But is Juluri also able to explain how we can begin to recover these 
knowledge traditions from centuries of misrepresentation? Does he find the terms to 
fathom “the world of wisdom” that Hindus have come from? Can he reformulate the 
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insights of these traditions in ways intelligible to the generation that he is addressing? In 
other words, is the potent rhetoric of his writing matched by an equally robust conceptual 
language?  
 
Hinduphobia 
Something is rotten in the study of Hinduism, Juluri rightly points out. While the field 
has seen controversy after controversy during the last decade or so, the turmoil has 
produced hardly any cognitive progress. Initially, there seemed to be some promise. 
Shocked by the way in which their traditions are portrayed in school textbooks and the 
academic world, highly-educated Indians living in the U.S. began to raise their voices. 
They uncovered genuine problems in the dominant accounts of ‘Hinduism’ and exposed 
harmful power structures in American academia. They expressed concerns and 
grievances shared by thousands of people. The language was sometimes aggressive but 
some of the criticism was equally incisive. 
It is painful to behold what is left of these original concerns: we are witness to 
campaigns to ban books and fire professors, to tweets and blogs consisting of vicious ad 
hominem attacks, and to racism directed at ‘white’ scholars. The other side – that of the 
mainstream academics in Hinduism studies – practices a form of intellectual terrorism 
that seeks to silence alternative voices by dismissing them as ideological, marginal, or 
unprofessional. Understandably, many scholars of India wish to stay away from what 
they call the ‘politics’ of the field. But they do so to no avail: the issues refuse to go 
away. Hence, it is high time for intellectuals to address them in reasonable ways.    
From the time of his earlier essay Hinduism and Its Culture Wars, Juluri added a 
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much-needed rational voice to these controversies (Juluri 2012). Like other voices, he is 
in search of a language to address the persistent misrepresentation of Hinduism. In his 
new work, he relies heavily on the term ‘Hinduphobia’ to do so. Hinduphobia, Juluri 
says, “is not a quirk or an individual stereotype that afflicts some individuals. It is a 
systematic distortion in human thought that serves to distract the world from the cruelty 
and the needlessness of suffering, not just Hindu, but all human and non-human suffering 
too” (18). Borrowed from the recent craze about ‘Islamophobia’, this term may appear to 
be an astute strategic choice to expose the rampant prejudice against Hinduism. However, 
how helpful is it to understand the current predicament in the study of India? How does it 
allow us to unearth and understand the systematic distortion in the current thinking about 
Indian culture? 
The answer, I submit, is that it does not get us very far at all. Much like 
‘Islamophobia’, ‘Hinduphobia’ is more of an empty label than a well-developed concept. 
Both scholarly work and popular opinion in the West often show explicit or implicit 
hostility towards Hinduism. Why is that the case? “Well, these people suffer from 
Hinduphobia.” It must be clear how poor an answer this is. Imagine a similar explanation 
of the fact that I feel uncomfortable in cramped spaces. “Oh, that’s because you suffer 
from claustrophobia.” What is claustrophobia? It is the fear of being in small or enclosed 
spaces. In other words, I fear being in cramped spaces because I suffer from the condition 
of fearing such spaces. Inevitably, ‘Hinduphobia’ will lead to similarly circular accounts 
that lack epistemic value.    
  Still, could we not use the term as a handy moniker to draw attention to the 
prejudices we regularly see in the Western representation of Hinduism? As Juluri 
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suggests, these often remain invisible today. Vices like racism or sexism are now 
recognizable and recognized. When there are flagrant public instances, people across the 
world get outraged. “But a massacre against Hindus does not seem to get the slightest 
reaction in the world press; except to perhaps say: ‘Let’s hope the Hindu fundamentalists 
now don’t go on a backlash!’” (18) We need some forceful term to expose such unfair 
attitudes, one could say. Why not use ‘Hinduphobia’ to point out this systematic 
distortion? 
Let me explain why I think it is unwise to do so. Critical work on Orientalism has 
indeed shown there is remarkable constancy in the reproduction of commonsense ideas 
and moral judgments in Western writings about India (37). Juluri points out this 
phenomenon in the recent work of Wendy Doniger, The Hindus: An Alternative History 
(2009). As he suggests, this work is anything but an alternative; it is “the last dominance-
display of a dying hegemony” (53), a particularly shallow American version of an age-
old story about Indian culture. While the mainstream media have made a lot of brouhaha 
about this book as a courageous attempt to challenge ‘Hindu nationalism’, it is really a 
bad case of Cold War social science, the ideological enterprise launched by U.S. 
universities in the postwar period. This type of writing hides propaganda for the 
American ideology of freedom under the cloak of ‘progressive’ scholarship. It 
systematically depicts non-Western societies as dens of tyranny and patriarchy and then 
purports the aim of saving the ‘oppressed’ groups and ‘liberal’ strands in a society from 
its dominant culture.  
Thus, Doniger’s story reproduces the systematic distortion of the Indian traditions 
that has occurred in mainstream scholarship from the early colonial era to this day. Now, 
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if the ‘Hinduphobia’ discourse is meant to characterize this distortion, it should also 
address some crucial questions: What is the systematicity in the distortion? How did this 
systematic distortion of Indian culture emerge and how can it survive? Why were 
centuries of scholarship, European and Indian alike, unable to escape from the 
distortion?  
Here, the notion does not work at all. Like other phobias, Hindu-phobia must 
revolve around fear or anxiety (otherwise, the term loses its meaning). But many scholars 
of Hinduism do not show any such anxiety towards their object of study. The nineteenth-
century Orientalists genuinely wanted to understand the cultures they wrote about; some 
even dedicated or sacrificed their lives to doing so (see Irwin 2007). Hinduism repelled 
some and appealed to others. From the German Romantics to the American Academy of 
Religion, a variety of Western authors expressed their love and admiration for Indian 
culture. Yet, as Juluri points out, even these scholars ended up reproducing Orientalist 
accounts about India in different guises. In spite of the variation in their preferred 
theories and value judgments, they agree about the same set of ‘facts’ as though these are 
self-evident: Indian culture consists of several religions; Hinduism is one such religion; it 
has priests and particular views about the divine; Hindus believe the cow is sacred and 
hence worship it; the caste system is the inegalitarian social structure of Indian society; 
this system transforms certain people into ‘untouchables’ and others into ‘upper castes’; 
etcetera.  
Why do scholars reproduce the same Orientalist consensus irrespective of their 
sympathy or antipathy towards Indian culture? One option is to say that these are indeed 
obvious facts. However, the philosophy of science has taught us that such facts are 
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always facts of a theory. In this case also, the relevant descriptions of the facts are 
structured by a particular set of concepts (‘religion’, ‘worship’, ‘sacred’, ‘the caste 
system’). Scholars of India may have worked with different ‘theories’ to make sense of 
what they believed to be the facts, but they did draw on the same conceptual apparatus to 
structure the facts themselves. Hence, to understand the process whereby scholars have 
reproduced the same basic descriptions for centuries, we need to focus on the cognitive 
framework that guided them all this time. Charging Western and Westernized 
intellectuals with ‘phobia’ towards Hinduism does not take us forward in any way here. 
To understand the systematic distortion in the dominant understanding of Indian culture 
that Juluri is so concerned about, we need to grasp the conceptual limitations that have 
compelled these people to see a particular set of ideas as facts about Indian culture and 
society.  
 
Eurocentrism 
Eurocentrism is another problematic concept that plays an important part in Juluri’s book. 
Consider his reflections on the Aryan Invasion theory. He rightly points out its dubious 
character and intends to trace the causes behind the distortion that led to the current 
‘Hinduphobic’ discourse. “The most obvious source of distortion in the writing of Hindu 
history may be described as Eurocentrism,” he suggests, a tendency which came along 
with the colonial project of domination (61). When the Europeans encountered other 
cultures, Juluri explains, they wished to convince themselves of their civilizational 
superiority. But in India they met with a civilized people. Therefore, “they came up with 
the theory that the Hindus were probably once of their own kind, now grown dark and 
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dull in the sun, the notorious Aryan Invasion theory” (61-2). In other words, 
Eurocentrism caused Hinduphobia.  
Let us take a closer look at this explanation. Over the years, Europe encountered 
several flourishing civilizations that showed substantial achievements, such as the 
Chinese, Japanese, or, say, the Aztecs. This gave rise to various reactions. Some 
attributed the civilized elements to a past where these nations still had inklings of the true 
God and His Will. In their own times, they saw rampant idolatry and immorality among 
the same nations, which they attributed to the corruption of religion. Since true religion 
was superior to false religion, Europeans faced no difficulty in dismissing these alien 
cultures as inferior, no matter how civilized they might look. Consequently, the fact that 
they found a civilized people in India (or in China or in Japan) cannot have compelled 
them to invent an invasion by a foreign nation sharing its ancestry with the Europeans. 
There is no causal connection between the ‘Eurocentric’ need to feel superior and the 
belief that the Hindu nation had originally invaded India.  
By giving this facile explanation, Juluri misses out on some basic questions: in the 
absence of empirical or theoretical evidence, what made the Orientalists postulate with 
such certainty that India had been invaded by an alien nation? What made it so obvious to 
them that the ancient religious history of India was to be characterized in terms of the 
links between a nation (the Aryans), a language (Sanskrit), a religion (Vedism, 
Brahmanism, and later on Hinduism), a priesthood (the Brahmins), and a hierarchical 
social structure (the caste system)? The formula ‘Eurocentrism causes Hinduphobia’ 
cannot even begin to address questions like these.  
It can only be applied algorithmically to any and all European descriptions of 
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other cultures: as colonizers, the Europeans wanted to feel superior; therefore, they came 
up with stories about other cultures to show how inferior those cultures were. From the 
1800s until the 1940s, Juluri says, “Orientalism about Hinduism was fuelled by the 
political interests of colonization, proselytization and the ideology of the ‘civilizing 
mission’,” which inspired the false fantasy about “Hinduism as a violent, superstitious, 
and barbaric religion, and its people as evolutionary inferiors” (37). Though popular, this 
type of account begs the question. Why did European colonial officials and missionaries 
give one particular account of India and not some other account? Among all the options 
they had to judge this culture inferior, why did they find it cogent to see the Hindus as a 
nation, their traditions as a religion, the Brahmins as a priesthood, Sanskrit as a sacred 
language, the dharmashastras as codes of law, the devas and devis as gods, puja as 
worship, and caste as a religiously sanctioned social hierarchy? Surely, these are 
questions we must look into. To do so requires fundamental research into Western culture 
and the development of its intellectual traditions.  
Here, Juluri’s book has little to offer, in spite of some intriguing suggestions. For 
instance, when he discusses the way in which modern scholars like Doniger read violence 
into Hinduism and its deities, he writes that this reading does not stem from a mere lack 
of understanding of India, but from “a deeper lack of self-reflexivity about the mythology 
of violence in Western thought itself.” “There are some ground assumptions about nature 
and violence in Western social thought and even more so in today’s popular culture,” he 
suggests, “that make some beliefs, theories and stories seem only ‘natural’ to everyone 
today (including non-Westerners as well, thanks to media and globalization)” (75). This 
is a thought-provoking suggestion: the Western search for violence and oppression in 
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other cultures is rooted in its own cultural stances concerning the naturalness of violence 
(83).  
At the same time, however, Juluri trivializes his own insights. Take his critique of 
Western modernity: it transforms the world into a machine and thus de-animates reality 
(67). He writes: “Today’s science and technology is not nature’s intelligence. It is 
artificial intelligence, unnatural intelligence” (7). This discourse derives from shifts 
within Western culture. Over time, counter-streams in the European intellectual traditions 
– Romanticism, the ‘noble savage’ tradition, the New Age movement, postmodern 
continental philosophy – produced a discourse which claimed that science transforms 
nature into a lifeless machine and subjects the natural world to the violence of human 
sovereignty. Here, the West becomes an intrinsically violent culture that instrumentalizes 
the natural world and alienates humanity from itself.  
While this story may contain a modicum of truth, it is also profoundly wrong: 
Christianity views the natural world as an embodiment of God’s Will, as the Book of 
Nature that needs to be deciphered along with the Book of Revelation. Many of the 
naturalists who first engaged in systematic scientific study of the natural world 
exemplified a profound love for nature, which characterizes Western culture as much as 
its other strands. So repeating the rhetoric of Western civilization’s self-critical moments 
cannot substitute for an Indian cultural critique of this civilization. It can only lead to 
loose rhetoric about science as ‘artificial’ or ‘unnatural’ intelligence (scientific 
knowledge is a product of human intelligence after all, not of artificial intelligence). 
The problem is that Juluri lacks any alternative conceptual framework for the 
study of Western culture and its discourse about other cultures. His understanding of 
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Europe – and the Western world more generally – corresponds more or less to the 
standard textbook account, with some negative valuations added to it. Now, this textbook 
account reflects the West’s self-image, an image whose structures and origins again 
cannot be understood without a deeper study of Western culture and its Christian 
religious foundations. 
Importantly, the above problems are not unique to Rearming Hinduism. They 
point to fundamental difficulties that face any attempt like Juluri’s – difficulties he is also 
aware of, to some extent. The conceptual language currently available to discuss Western 
and Indian culture is a product of centuries of Western theorizing about the human world. 
Theory formation in the social sciences and humanities has so far been the territory of 
Western thinkers and the same theorizing also provided the frameworks for describing 
other cultures like that of India. This we cannot remedy by introducing terms like 
‘Eurocentrism’ or ‘Hinduphobia’, since these give no insight into the dynamics and 
cognitive limitations of a culture. As the work of Balagangadhara (2005 and 2012) has 
shown so cogently, only when we have done a very serious and scientific study of 
Western culture will we be able to go beyond the distortions inherent to the Orientalist 
representations of Indian culture.  
 
Rediscovery 
How then can we rediscover the knowledge offered by the Hindu traditions in the face of 
centuries of misunderstanding? While addressing this question, Juluri is very much aware 
that twenty-first-century Hindus “have not yet found a voice for what it means to speak 
of a Hindu world today, or of the world as Hindus today” (182). To do justice to his 
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work, we need to appreciate how it provides an impetus for this quest to find a new voice, 
while it also stumbles upon the obstacles that stand in the way.  
As many thinkers have pointed out, the hold of colonialism on Indian society has 
gone much further than material exploitation or political domination. It did not end on 15 
August 1947 “at the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps.” In a crucial 
sense, India is yet to “awake to life and freedom.” In Juluri’s words: 
 
For several hundred years, Hindus were forced to just about survive culturally in 
the face of colonialism. We kept our customs, temples, and beliefs, but we could 
not assert the philosophies underlying them intellectually. After independence, we 
neglected our own history, and more or less accepted what we were given by our 
former masters. In more recent times, with the rise of a global Hindu middle class, 
we have started to become more self-aware, and assertive too. But the problem is 
that we still do not know what is the right answer. (60) 
 
This predicament afflicts all the traditions of India. While Indian culture was transmitted 
from mother to child and from generation to generation in the form of all kinds of 
practices and stories, colonialism caused a rupture in the transmission of this culture’s 
modes of thinking and theorizing. It tried to replace them with the discourse about India 
that is still dominant, namely the stories that conceptualize its culture in terms of 
‘religion’, ‘worship’, ‘the caste system’, ‘superstition’, and similar notions. To recover 
the Indian modes of reflection from this colonial rupture and to assess what remains 
valuable in them are two of the great challenges facing contemporary India.  
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This is the quest for an Indian cultural renaissance. As Juluri knows, he is not 
traveling alone on these roads and he is not the only one confronting the obstacles he 
finds on his way. These obstacles have to be unearthed and understood, before they can 
be overcome. Just consider one example: Juluri’s remarks on the traditional stories of the 
Hindu traditions. How should we understand the many narratives about Rama, Shiva, 
Krishna, Kali, and the other devas and devis? What is the role of epics like the 
Mahabharata and the Ramayana in Indian culture? The current framework inherited from 
Western colonialism gives only two options: these are either myth or history. Either you 
know that all these stories are myths and did not really happen; or you must believe that 
they did happen and then you give them the status of historiography.  
Juluri remarks that “in our hearts, we cannot ever think of the deeds of our gods 
as mere fairy-tales. We do not know yet what to call them, so for now we call them, 
respectfully, stories about our gods. We somehow feel they happened, if not literally, at 
least loosely” (58). Modern academics, he points out, want to show that these stories are 
fiction. In response, Hindus argue that they are history. But, between these two positions, 
they forget the obvious: “These are neither myth, in the sense of fantasy-tales for 
entertainment, nor are they histories, in the sense of what social groups do with each 
other” (102). What then are they? “They are god-stories; a truly significant, enduring, and 
inspiring form of culture. God-stories are stories about God.” We may disagree about 
God but we can still recognize the undeniable value of these stories (102). 
What is this value that the stories of the Hindu traditions have? Calling them god-
stories or stories about God can give some kind of temporary emotional relief in face of 
the claim that they are mere myths. However, it leads one into to the same traps set by the 
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Western-Orientalist accounts of Indian culture. Since medieval times, ‘God’ is first and 
foremost a term from the Bible and the proper name of the Divinity of Christianity – the 
omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent creator of the world. This religious framework 
determined the way in which the word ‘God’ is used in English, often in ways that we are 
not aware of. Under its terms, one can give two types of accounts about God: true 
doctrine or false fabrications.  
Looking at the Hindu traditions, Christian missionaries and European Orientalists 
saw in them false accounts of God and His creation. They characterized ‘Hinduism’ as a 
form of pantheism mingled with polytheism (or later as ‘kathenotheism’, in Friedrich 
Max Müller’s term). They said that Hindus wrongly believe that the natural world is 
suffused by God and think that He is present in all of us and in all of nature. Within the 
framework of Christian orthodoxy, this pantheism is but a heresy. Accepting that the 
Hindu traditions revolve around ‘God’ and that they find God in all life – or 
understanding the Hindu stories as stories about God, as Juluri does – implies an implicit 
acceptance of these accounts of Hinduism as some form of theism, as an erring variant of 
Christianity. One could suggest that ‘God’ has another meaning for Hindus, but this is 
precisely what missionaries were saying all along: Hindus do not know God’s revelation 
of Himself; therefore, they inevitably view the divine and its relation to the world and 
humanity in a different way (that is a false way). One cannot escape this framework by 
removing the predicate of falsity and keeping the rest of the claims about Hinduism and 
its stories about ‘God’. When one reproduces the terms of this religious framework, one 
ends up with a veiled reproduction of its conclusions, no matter how positive or 
sympathetic one may be towards the Hindu traditions.  
	 16 
How could Juluri avoid such traps in elaborating his important insight that the 
stories that are so important to Indian culture can count neither as fictional myths nor as 
disguised historiographies? Currently, he cannot, simply because there is no framework 
available that enables him to do so. From fragmentary insights, he seems almost 
compelled to fall back into the very conceptual language that trivializes these insights.  
For instance, Juluri repeatedly suggests that experience, rather than theory, is 
central to Hinduism and that its traditions revolve around “a socially endowed practice of 
cultivated intelligence to sustain that experience” (150). When discussing the Bhagavad 
Gita, he goes to the core of that experience: “One supersoul in which all we individuals 
feel the illusion of separation, go through life and its story thinking I, we, mine; thinking, 
my soul, when all there is just One, daring you to live up to it in and through and past 
your mind” (180). But together with such intriguing formulations of the central concerns 
of the Hindu traditions, he also says that “the language of Hinduism” is ultimately the 
language of the heart (142), that “God is not a mere theory for us, but experience” (150) 
and that “Hinduism is sensibility, not doctrine. It is what we feel, and not what the 
experts say it’s about. It is what we feel” (141). For whom is God ‘a mere theory’? He is 
certainly not that for Christians, Jews, and Muslims. They seek faith in God, total 
surrender to Him, which does not revolve around doctrine. Thus, for them also, religion is 
what they experience and what they feel, rather than mere dogma. To act as though such 
claims characterize Hinduism is to profoundly trivialize it.      
Perhaps it is inappropriate to put heavy cognitive demands on a book like 
Rearming Hinduism, which has no theoretical pretentions. However, it does aim to be “a 
handbook for intellectual resistance” addressed to a new generation of Hindus trying to 
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make sense of their traditions in the face of centuries of distortion. To succeed here, a 
genuine understanding is required of what caused the distortion: the currently dominant 
conceptual framework and its limitations and implications. Today’s Hindus are facing the 
same old questions raised by and within this framework: “Why do you worship the cow 
and the phallus? How can you give up your individual autonomy to gurus and god-men? 
Do you believe in reincarnation? Do you support the caste system?”  
To gain an understanding of the framework that raises and answers such 
questions, one needs to study the culture that has produced it. One will have to re-
examine the structures and dynamics of Western culture and its relation to the Christian 
religion. The challenge is to develop an alternative research program about Western 
culture, which is cognitively superior to the currently dominant accounts and which 
uncovers the limitations of this culture and its understanding of the human world in 
general and other cultures in particular. Before coming to a rediscovery of their own 
culture, then, the new generation of Indians will have to understand the cultural 
framework that has come in between and that prevents them from finding their own voice 
in the world of the twenty-first century.  
 
Conclusion 
We live in an era when Asian giants like India are rising to a more prominent place on the 
global stage. Much as the dominance of the West went far beyond the realm of politics or 
the economy, this global shift will give rise to new attempts to establish a cultural and 
intellectual hegemony – this time from the side of Asian cultures. In India, it is already 
giving rise to “the stormy rumblings of a cultural and intellectual hunger that those who 
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do not understand reduce to its one political face as Hindu nationalism,” as Juluri writes 
(120). This will go hand-in-hand with the building of new research groups and 
institutions that challenge the hegemonic frameworks and institutions in the academic 
world and the media. When successful, such attempts would have consequences that we 
cannot even begin to assess today: cultural traditions that are not of Abrahamic religious 
stock shall begin to reconfigure the world we live in.  
What would this new world look like? What would happen if Indian cultural and 
intellectual traditions were to reshape our political thinking and institutions or, say, our 
educational theories and universities? All we can say today is: “We don’t know.” Still, as 
intellectuals, we need to understand and guide this process, so that the new hegemony can 
take as humane and reasonable a form as possible. Our current ignorance prevents us 
from taking up this task.  
Rearming Hinduism is a resounding call for an alternative to the currently 
dominant approaches to the Hindu traditions. It not only conveys a sense of urgency to go 
beyond the framework inherited from centuries of colonialism, but also looks for a new 
approach that can recover the world of wisdom out of which these traditions emerged. 
Juluri realizes that it will not be easy to find a voice and a language to make this world 
accessible once again. It takes the work of generations to pave the road to the renaissance 
of a culture. If he is right, a new generation inspired by a “vast civilizational hunger” will 
soon be ready to take up this task. While Juluri has not yet found the kind of nourishment 
that could satisfy this hunger, we can only hope that this new generation of Indians will 
share his humane stance towards the beings living in this world, human and otherwise. 
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